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Abstract—The Stable Marriage Problem, as proposed by Gale
and Shapley, considers producing a bipartite matching between
two equally sized sets of boys (proposers) and respectively girls
(acceptors), each member having a total preference order over
the other set, such that the outcome is stable. In this paper
we consider the Game directly induced by this problem and
analyze the case when proposers collude. We present a linear time
method for determining the unique optimal collusion matching
which is farsightedly stable, under the following assumptions:
(i) the sole utility in the Game is the rank of the match in
own preference list (in particular, proposers are indifferent as
to how other proposers fare); (ii) proposers make proposals iff
farsightedly such plays would strictly improve their own outcome
(thus proposers cooperate by refraining from making proposals
which can only harm others, but not strictly help them; also,
they cannot make concessions to others which harm themselves).
We argue that this optimal outcome is actually stronger than a
Strong Nash Equilibrium - no alternative feasible coalition exists
which can offer at least one member a strictly better outcome
under these assumptions. We also show why some prior results
pertaining to collusion of proposers do not always yield a realistic
outcome.
The results in this paper are an independent rediscovery of results
by Jun Wako (2010), derived in a simpler fashion and phrased
such that less jargon is employed.
Index Terms—Stable Marriage; Farsighted Stability; Gale-
Shapley; Collusion; Strategic Play;
I. INTRODUCTION
The stable marriage problem was introduced to literature
largely by Gale and Shapley in [1] where they provided an
O(n2) algorithm which produces a stable matching between
the two sets. A stable matching in their view is one such where
there exists no boy and no girl which both prefer each other
over their respective partners in the matching. This can be
viewed as strict stability or short-sighted stability. Once such
a matching is attained it obviously cannot be broken since any
individual proposal is doomed to failure: no boy (proposer)
would ever be interested to make a proposal to any girl who
would accept him over her then-current partner.
In this paper we take a rather different approach to sta-
bility. Namely we consider that a matching is stable if it
isfarsightedly stable. That is, if no boy (or set of boys for
that matter) can make a proposal or set of proposals (after
dumping their original partners in the matching) such that,
given the way in which all the boys will play as a result the
subsequent proposals made - his (their) final outcome would
strictly improve. The concept for farsighted stability implies
that a boy will not make any moves which ultimately do not
strictly benefit him. So a matching that is farsightedly stable is
not necessarily strictly stable (Gale-Shapley stable). However
it nevertheless represents a final (stable) outcome of the game
so long as all actors understand that they cannot improve by
any strategy.
A. Prior work
The stable marriage problem was introduced to literature
largely by Gale and Shapley in [1] where they provided an
O(n2) algorithm which produces a stable matching between
the two groups. A stable matching is one such that there exists
no boy and no girl which both prefer each other over their
respective partners in the matching. Robert W. Irving studied
in [2] the case where the preferences lists allow indifference
between different partners and provided several algorithms for
determining stable matchings (if they exist) in such cases. A
few fundamental issues concerning strategic play were studied
in [3] by Dubins and Freedman where they showed that no
coalition of boys can improve the outcome for all of them,
by lying about their preferences. In a sequel paper [4], Gale
and Sotomayor analyzed the case with lying by the girls.
Further analysis of strategic play by girls has been performed
by Deng, Shen and Tang in [16]. In [5] the authors concerned
themselves with lying by the boys in matching markets where
one side only has a constant number of preferences and also
acknowledged that “no matching mechanism based on a stable
marriage algorithm can guarantee truthfulness as a dominant
strategy for participants”. Another prior paper concerning itself
with misrepresentation is [6]. Some variations to the stable
marriage problem concerning the simultaneous introduction
of ties and seeking a more balanced matching (favoring the
girls more than in Gale-Shapley) have been shown in [7] to be
hard (with regard to NP completeness). A series of existential
results concerning strategic play in stable marriage problem
and some of its variations have been presented by Roth in
[8]. In [9] the authors analyzed strategic play by girls and
offered several results. Finally, in [10], Huang analyzed cases
of strategic plays by boys consisting of collusion in order to
achieve a better outcome for some (not all) of them. The
novelty was that such outcomes are not necessarily stable.
They are however no worse than Gale-Shapley and are also on
the Pareto frontier of outcomes no worse than Gale-Shapley.
This prompted Huang to imply that such outcome is the best
possible for boys. His approach consisted of improving a Gale-
Shapley matching by discovering and materializing “trading
cycles”, using the top-trading-method described in [11]. Using
Huang’s work, in [17], Aksoy, Azzam, Coppersmith, Glass,
Karaali, Zhao and Zhu discuss marriage problem allocation
striving to balance stability with efficiency. Since our paper
proposes an realistic matching unlike [10], it is relevant to
the discussion in [17]. A brief survey of results concerning
stable marriage problem was published in 2008, in [12] by
Iwama and Miyazaki. A general and very relevant situation
where the actual utility gained by men in a matching can be
modeled in terms of transferable utility (e.g. monetary value)
with side-payments allowed has been studied by Rahul Jain
in [13]. Furthermore, just as we, the Author, were about to
publish this paper for peer review, we discovered that Jun
Wako [19] had also discovered esentially precisely the results
of this paper, relying on concepts such as von Neumann-
Morgenstern stable sets, core and others. We present a simpler
and much more direct approach, requiring very few if any
theoretical prerequisits. The concept of farsighted stability has
been employed by Klaus, Klijn and Walzl for the related room-
mates matching problem in [15].
B. Overview of this paper
The main result in this paper is a method for obtaining the
best possible farsightedly stable matching for some boy. We
proceed to show that in fact there is a unique farsightedly
stable matching which is best for any of the boys (so the
individual best outcome for an arbitrary boy is obtained in
this one). We start by providing an O(n3) algorithm and then
improve it to a O(n2) one.
The second result is that we argue why the matching
produced by the top-trading-cycles method used by Huang
in [10] is not realistic. We give an example to illustrate the
difference between our method and [10] and discuss why the
former produces a realistic outcome while the latter does not.
In the terminology of [10], we claim that Huangs result is
sometimes unrealistic because it entails cooperation of more
accomplices than needed, with some accomplices actually
having the incentive to refuse cooperation since they can
obtain a better outcome (become cabalists in terminology of
[10]) by not cooperating.
Finally we illustrate by example a situation where boys
can lie about their preference lists (to other boys, before the
actual game play) in order to alter the optimal farsighted stable
outcome to their favor. This situation is not possible under the
assumptions of the present paper since lying actually implies
a boy can make a proposal which does not improve his own
outcome but to the contrary it makes it worse (with regard
to his truthful preference list), however it is worth noting
nevertheless.
C. Motivation
This paper is motivated primarily by effect of our results
on the numerous economic situations which can be formulated
as instances of the stable marriage problem. There are many
examples in literature, such as Renter-Landlord, Contractor
Project, Student Program placement, Ads placement and
Wireless Communications [14] where our results can apply.
For almost all such applications strategic play can play an
important role. As such, we consider important the limitations
of [10] (which is, to the best of our knowledge, the current
state of the art in this regard) are noted and the qualitative
improvements we make are considered.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We consider the Game directly induced by the Stable
Marriage Problem as follows: there is a set of players (the
proposers, the boys) and a set of acceptors. Players can
propose to acceptors during the game play. An acceptor (a
girl) always accepts (or keeps) the best proposal and dumps
(refuses) any lower one. As such, in the scope of this paper,
we ignore any potential strategic behavior by acceptors. They
are considered robotic elements with no actual decisions. The
utility in the game for each player is the rank of his final match
(the one after the game ends) the lower this rank (the more
preferred the match) the strictly higher the utility. The game is
considered to end when no proposer (boy) can take any action
which would farsightedly strictly improve his outcome.
Please note that the final condition implies the game can
end before a strictly stable (Gale-Shapley stable) matching is
attained. Also note that for the Game to end, no set of the boys
can have a strategy available to them so that, given the strategy
of the other players, the former could hope to improve.
Speculative play when a boy proposes to some girl and
finally dumps her (during the course of the game, not during
preliminary negotiations) is actually irrelevant once the game
has actually begun, under our assumption set: the boy will
only be interested to dump if, by dumping he can improve
his own final outcome. And if he has a strategy of improving
this final outcome he could just as well not have proposed to
her in the first place but instead chosen the alternative strategy
directly.
A. Assumptions
When considering coalitions we need to distinguish between
feasible and unfeasible ones. What makes a coalition unfea-
sible? While it can be philosophically difficult to describe
objectively what makes a coalition unfeasible in this context,
it can be done. Intuitively we will say that a coalition is
unfeasible if it requires that a boy gets a strictly worse
outcome than he can get if he did not part-take in the coalition
(require him to make a concession). However, this strictly
worse outcome is a function of the behavior and predilections
of all the other players in the game. Thus, in order to be able
to answer this question we need to examine these behaviors
also. Note that while girls are not considered players, having
no decision points, their preference lists are very relevant to
the outcome of the collusion between boys. A boy can end
up matched with a girl g by persuading all boys who are
better preferred than him by g to never propose to her in the
game. However, he does not need to care about the rest their
cooperation is not required.
In the scope of this paper we introduce two natural as-
sumptions in order to be able to reason about how boys
behave. These assumptions do not limit generality significantly
and they are strictly upheld in most situations occurring in
practice. They are also implicitly made in most of the existing
literature (although interesting situations can arise when they
are relaxed). All in all, the case where they hold is worth
investigating in its own right.
Assumption 1: The sole utility boys seek to optimize in the
game is the rank on their preference list of the match they get.
Thus, they will always strictly prefer an outcome that offers
them individually a better (final) match. Thus, they will
never accept to part-take in a coalition which offers them a
worse outcome than one guaranteed by a different coalition
(e.g. consisting of only themselves). Also, they will be fully
indifferent as to how the other boys fair so long as it does
not affect their own matching. In particular they will not take
sides and will not care which one of the other boys fairs
better than the other. It could, of course, be interesting to
examine (especially in the context of repeat games), behaviors
of boys which are friends or allies and favor one-another. This
potentially interesting situation is outside the scope of this
paper.
Assumption 2: Proposals are made iff farsightedly they
improve the outcome for the proposer. We require of players
who can make such a proposal that, given how the other
players play as a result, they would get a strictly better
outcome at the end of the Game, that they indeed make one
such proposal. Also we require that a player who does not
have such a proposal available to him, that he does not make
any proposals (even if he can have a proposal which would
improve his outcome, but only temporarily before the other
players finish making their plays).
Assumption 2 actually excludes (i) concessions and (ii)
threats in negotiation of the coalition outcome. Note that while
concessions are typically excluded as irrational behavior any-
way, in practice sometimes players may not know whether they
are making a concession or not due to insufficient theoretical
knowledge of the Stable Marriage topic. For example, some
required accomplices for the coalition resulting from Huangs
approach [10] might have accepted to join such a coalition
(before reading our paper) even though it did not offer them
the best outcome they could get. When it comes to threats,
Assumption 2 essentially excludes suicidal threats when a
player says (before the game is played!) something like if
you dont agree to give me my desired girl, I will make sure
you dont get your desired girl either, even if it means I get a
worse outcome then I could have gotten. Such threat making
may not necessarily be irrational the threat may be feasible
and it might work, thus resulting in the threat maker being
persuasive. Threat making greatly complicates game analysis
and is also risky for the threat-maker: the instance he proposed
to a worse girl than he is guaranteed to get under Assumptions
1 and 2, the others (in particular just the sole boy from whom
he takes this girl) can punish him by letting him matched
with this undesired choice. This in fact leads to situations of a
Game of Ultimatum. Such situations, while they can be very
interesting and generate surprising outcomes, are outside the
scope of this paper. They will be discussed in a subsequent
one.
B. Conventions
Notation 1: We use the following notation to denote a play
at some stage of the Stable Marriage Game. bx → gy(bt)|bz →
... → gz , with the meaning that bx proposed to gy and as a
result bz (we can have bz = bx) was expelled from gy (losing
to bt) and went on to propose to some other girl and so on
until some boy proposed to gz , who was unmatched, ending
the play. We call each portion separated by — an element of
the play. We can omit the parenthesis (like (bt)) since it is
obvious who was the victor in that element by analyzing the
next one.
Notation 2: We use the following notation to denote a
cooperative switching of partners: gy|bx → fz|bz → ...gy,
with the meaning that boy bx renounces his then-current
partner gy and successfully proposes to girl gz whom bz
renounced and so on, until a boy proposes to the original (now
unmatched) girl gy .
Note that a trading cycle may not always be feasible under
Assumption 2 (lead to a farsighted improvement). Unlike in
other resource allocation problems where the resources are
fully passive, the fact the girls of the Stable Marriage problems
keep the best proposal they get affects the relative power of the
boys. They are not always free to trade their partners as they
choose since once traded, other boys (who would have been
rejected under the initial matching) could now successfully
propose to the girls of the trading cycle, effectively vetoing
it. This is something that was not fully properly considered in
[10]. Note however, that, under Assumption 2, boys can (and
must) veto only if this results in them farsightedly improving
their own outcome; not for revenge or other purposes.
Definition 1: Temperature of girls. We call the rank in her
preference list of the then-current partner of a girl during the
course of the game as the temperature of said girl.
Note that since girls are considered robotic in the scope
of this paper, the temperature of any girl is non-decreasing
throughout the Game-Play: girls get better and better partners,
never worse.
III. FARSIGHTED STABLE MATCHING
We now proceed to examine how boys can collude to im-
prove their individual outcome in the Stable Marriage Game.
It is known that Gale-Shapleys algorithm offers the unique
man-optimal strictly stable matching ([1],[10]). No other
strictly stable matching exists which offers any of the boys
a better outcome. We present a similar algorithm which gen-
erates the unique man-optimal farsightedly stable matching.
We call a matching farsightedly stable iff under Assump-
tions 1 and 2, there are no more allowed plays by any
of the boys. We can allow boys to dump girls from this
matching (including all of them all girls) but we do require
in the context of farsightedness that every boy eventually
proposes to some girl (no boy can remain unmatched). Note
that if we had relaxed Assumption 2 to allow moves which
farsightedly produce no strict improvement, then the Gale-
Shapley matching would be farsightedly stable.
When investigating the coalitions in which a boy could part
take, we first ask ourselves: what is the worse outcome that
could happen for him?
Theorem 1: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, every boy in a
Stable Marriage Game gets no worse an outcome than in Gale-
Shapley. Regardless what coalitions form and no matter what
their strategies are, every boy in a Stable Marriage Game has
a strategy to ensure that he gets a partner no-worse than Gale-
Shapley, so long as Assumptions 1 and 2 are upheld.
Proof: By way of contradiction we shall show that no
worse outcome of the Game can occur. Let us consider any
potential final outcome of the game where some boy b gets a
worst match than in Gale Shapley. Say boy bs Gale-Shapley
partner was taken up by another boy, b1 in this outcome. By
induction we obtain a ring of boys, b, b1, b2, ..., bk, all of whom
occupy the Gale-Shapley partner of their left neighbour and
have their own Gale-Shapley partner occupied by their right
one (wrapping around if necessary). Clearly b prefers if he
were coupled with his Gale Shapley partner (contradiction
hypothesis). But b1 also prefers the hypothetical outcome
worse than if he were coupled with his own Gale Shapley
partner (otherwise he would have proposed there in the course
of Gale Shapley algorithm, meaning that would no longer have
been the final partner for b). Similarly so do b2, ..., bk. But
then a trading cycle forms where each boy becomes coupled
with the partner of his right neighbor (wrapping around). Since
this trading cycle would offer strictly better outcomes to all
players on it, by Assumptions 1 and 2, they are all intrested
in its materialization. Could any of the other players veto the
new arrangement? Not really. Say another boy bz is interest
to successfully propose to the match of one of the boys on
the cycle (after materialization) over his own. But the boy on
the cycle is coupled with his Gale-Shapley partner; as such,
he is best prefered there over all other boys who get a Gale-
Shapley or better outcome (and thus never propose to less
preferred choices). It follows that bz also got a worse match
than in Gale-Shapley. Furthermore, bz prefers his own Gale-
Shapley over both his then-current one and over the match
of any boy in the trading cycle where he could successfully
propose. As such, bz is either part of the original trading cycle,
or another such cycle emerges. Inductively, the set of such
cycles is a farsighted improvement for all boys involved. As
such, it follows that the Game had not ended, contradicting
the initial assumption that the outcome was final. Note that
the actual move to be played may not be materializing these
cycles (some boys might be able to get even better) but if
no other move exists (which farsightedly improves things for
someone), then this one is definitely valid.
The theorem implies that no boy will support a coalition
offering him worse than Gale-Shapley.
In every Stable Marriage Game, there exists at least one
player who cannot get better than Gale Shapley either. It is
very easy to find one: consider the player who made the last
proposal in the course of Gale Shapley algorithm: he gets
a girl to whom nobody else ever proposed and also all his
better preferred choices are taken by people who are better
preferred than him there. Such a player is a hopeless man in
the terminology of [10]. We show that he is also hopeless
considering farsighted stability.
Theorem 2: The sole proposer to some girl in Gale Shapley
is a hopeless man, under Assumptions 1 and 2. There exists
no outcome where such a boy can farsightedly get a strictly
better match.
Proof: Similar results have been proven throughout lit-
erature. For completeness we include our proof also. Proof
proceeds by contradiction. Say that such a boy b would get
a better partner than Gale Shapley, g1. But g1 is the Gale
Shapley partner of some other boy, b1. For the outcome to
be final, it follows that b1 must get a strictly better outcome
than g1 (since, by Theorem 1, he can get no worse). Again, a
ring of boys b, b1, ..., bk forms, where each boy takes the Gale
Shapley partner of the boy to the right (wrapping around).
Furthermore, all boys can force their left neighbor out. All
boys must prefer this outcome over the Gale-Shapley one.
But bk gets as partner the Gale-Shapley partner of b which
is strictly worse for him than his own Gale-Shapley partner
(otherwise he would have proposed to her before his final
match in the course of that algorithm). By Assumption 2,
bk cannot support such a coalition as per Theorem 1 he is
guaranteed to get at least his Gale-Shapley partner if not better.
In particular bk can simply knock out his left neighbor in the
ring who can also proceed to knock out his left one and so
on.
By Theorems 1 and 2 we immediately derive the optimal
farsighted outcome for a hopeless man: it is his Gale-Shapley
match. By Assumption 2, if he gets this outcome he must not
make any proposals. But there are several ways in which this
hopeless man can attain it: the worse (for the others) is if he
proposed in order of preference to all girls until getting this
outcome. However, by Assumption 1, this play would be just
as good to him as the play where he makes a single proposal
to this optimal partner. The hopeless man has no incentive
(in the context of a game) to help others, but no disincentive
either! Furthermore, under Assumption 2, once he realizes
his optimal outcome he must not make any more plays. In
particular, if the boys who are (temporarily) coupled with some
other girls all decided to dump their partners and renegotiate
the situation, the hopeless man would be (by Assumption 2)
required to refrain from making any plays: no matter what he
did, farsightedly there is still no way he could end up strictly
better off (by Theorem 2).
A hopeless man effectively has a very simple strategy which
guarantees he will get his optimal outcome: play directly there.
If he does so, given Theorem 6 no boy will challenge him
there. Furthermore, he can help the others by not having
uselessly raised the temperature of some girls during game
play. In practice he could still veto some coalitions at no cost
to him (change his strategy to disallow certain outcomes) - but
by Assumption 1 this cannot benefit him. While in practice he
could, at no cost, very well be spiteful or vengeful in case he
wanted to help a friend and the others refused, within the scope
of this paper this is explicitly disallowed by Assumptions 1
and 2. In some practical implementations (for example Student
Medical Program matching), players are not allowed to dump
partners. However we can make our Assumptions 1 and 2 hold
in this case simply by requiring that a hopeless man plays to
his optimal outcome directly.
Since a hopeless man ends up coupled with his Gale Shapley
partner (whom no one else wants), we can simply eliminate
him from the set of players and then repeat the procedure until
no more players are left.
Algorithm 1:
1: Consider the set of boys B and of girls G, with preference
lists PB and PG respectively.
2: Let (b1, g1) be the final proposal made in running Gale
Shapley algorithm for instance (B,G, PB, PG).
3: Match b1 to g1 permanently.
4: Remove b1 from B and g1 from G.
5: If the set of boys is not empty, go to Step 2.
Correctness: Would it ever make sense (farsightedly) for a
boy b still in play to successfully propose to some girl who
has been eliminated at some prior iteration of Step 4? Not
really. Consider for the sake of contradiction the earliest
boy b1 who was eliminated at Step 4, who would, in this
hypothetical scenario by kicked out of his girl g1 by some
boy not eliminated before. Since there are no proposals made
to girls eliminated at prior stages, those girls (and their partner
boys) can be fully disregarded form the subsequent problem
instances. But by Theorems 1 and 2 boy b1s match is precisely
g1. As such, any resulting matching will not be final (since
in the final farsighted stable matching boy b1 remains coupled
with precisely g1). The move by boy b cannot farsightedly
improve his outcome and is thus disallowed by Assumption 2.
Complexity Analysis: For Stable Marriage problem with n
boys, the algorithm essentially consists of n runs of the Gale-
Shapley algorithm, the first on a problem with all n boys, then
on one with n− 1 boys, then on one with n− 2 boys and so
on until there is only one boy remaining. The running time for
Gale-Shapley is O(n2) for n boys, thus the total running time
is O(12+22+...+n2) = O(n3). The memory consumed is also
dominated by Gale-Shapley (but can be reused by different
iterations of Step 2) and is thus O(n2).
Uniqueness: Note that the order in which the boys are
presented to Step 2 of Algorithm 1 can affect the choice of
hopeless man in Step 3. However, if a man was hopeless
before the elimination of another hopeless man, he is still
hopeless afterwards: In the proof of Theorem 2 such a hopeless
man could not have been part of the ring b, b1, ..., bk of
boys in any other capacity than b (since his left neighbor
cannot prefer his Gale Shapley partner to whom he never
proposes over his own). So eliminating some other hopeless
man leaves the ring constructed in the proof applicable also
on the outstanding problem instance to all hopeless men not
eliminated. Furthermore, the Gale-Shapley partner of these
hopeless men does not change: by the prior argument it cannot
get better, the elimination of a boy cannot degrade it, and the
elimination of a girl irrelevant to all boys cannot degrade it
either. As such, the order in which hopeless men are eliminated
by Step 4 is irrelevant to the final outcome, which is thus
unique for a particular Stable Marriage problem instance.
The significance of the Uniqueness of the farsighted stable
matching produced by Algorithm 1 cannot be understated. It
follows that Algorithm 8 produces the unique man-optimal
farsightedly stable matching. In particular there exists no
farsightedly stable matching which gives any of the players
a strictly better outcome (degrading or not some of the rest).
As such, this collusion outcome is even stronger than a
Strong Nash Equilibrium (which requires only there exists no
alternative coalition improving all of its members outcomes,
where as we show that there exists none which improves any
of its members). In fact there exists no other farsightedly stable
matching, under the natural Assumptions 1 and 2.
IV. LINEAR ALGORITHM
The idea behind the linear time algorithm we present in this
section is to avoid having to do repeat runs of Gale-Shapley in
Step 2 of Algorithm 1, but instead somehow keep and update
some state which allows us to find a hopeless man directly.
Consider a Gale-Shapley implementation where boys are
introduced to the problem one by one, in some order. When a
boy is introduced, a round of play happens starting with him
proposing to his best preferred girl and either kicking someone
out or continuing to his next preference. The then-uncoupled
boy (who may be the same as before the proposal) proposes
to his next preference and so on until finally some boy (not
necessarily the one initiating in the round) proposes to some
unmatched girl, ending the round. As a result of a round, the
matching for some (or all) of the boys can change.
Consider the permutation of the boys consisting of the
reverse order of their elimination in Step 4 of Algorithm 1. If
we happened to get lucky and run Gale-Shapley by introducing
the boys in this order, after the first run, updating the state
would be very easy: we would simply remove the last play
(necessarily made by a then-hopeless man), as the remaining
rounds would form precisely a Gale-Shapley iteration for the
outstanding boys.
While we cannot know the correct order in advance, we are
able to reconstruct it incrementally on the fly as we eliminate
hopeless men. We do this by determining what the last round
of play would have been if the boys had been presented in the
ideal order.
Note that as boys are eliminated from a Stable Marriage
problem instance, the set of proposals made under Gale-
Shapley by the outstanding players either contracts or stays the
same. This follows trivially if we consider the eliminated boy
as initiating the last round in a Gale-Shapley implementation.
As such, if a hopeless man was to have been presented last
to Gale-Shapley, then his round would still be a play consisting
of a subset of all the proposals in the game.
The algorithm proceeds by essentially identifying the pre-
cise set of proposals which are part of such a last round,
should the hopeless man have been presented last to Gale-
Shapley algorithm implementation and then eliminates them.
Equivalently, it determines the Gale-Shapley matching after
the elimination of the hopeless man and all his proposals. It
does so by repeatedly eliminating trading cycles which cannot
be legitimately vetoed at the time.
Algorithm 2: The algorithm consists of three routines and
uses some global variables, as follows.
Input: Let n denote the number of boys (and of girls).
Let PBb,i and PGg,i be n by n matrices representing the
preference lists of boys and girls respectively. We require that
the sort order of preferences for the boys is best prefered first,
while for the girls is best prefered last.
State: Let EXISTSb,g be a n by n matrix of Boolean values
initially set to false. It is used to represent if a proposal from
a boy to a girl exists.
Let Indexb, be an n-sized integer vector representing the
index in his preference list of the worse proposal by a boy
still in play. This must be initialized to −1.
Let Topg, be an n-sized integer vector representing the index
of the current match of a girl in her preference list. This must
be initialized to −1.
Let Secondg, be an n-sized integer vector representing the
index of the immediately less preferred choice for a girl g
after top one, from all men who ever proposed to her.
Let NumProposals, be an n-sized integer vector used to
maintain the current number of proposals still in play made to
some girl g.
Helpers: Let seenb, be an n-sized integer vector used in depth
first walk, holding values only 0, 1 or 2.
Output: Let Mb be an n-sized integer vector. It will hold the
final partner for any boyb after FindMatching() is called.
1: METHOD FindMatching()
2: Run of Gale Shapley algorithm for (B,G, PB, PG).
3: for all proposals (b, g) made in line 2, in that order do
4: EXISTSb,g ← true
5: Increment Indexb
6: if proposal (b, g) is successful then
7: Secondg ← Topg
8: repeat
9: Increment Topg
10: until PGg,Topg = b
11: end if
12: end for
13: for exactly n iterations do
14: g1 ← some arbitrary girl with NumProposalsg1 = 1
15: b1 ← PGg1,Topg1
16: Mb1 ← g1 and remove b1 from play.
17: EliminateProposalsByBoy(b1,−1)
18: Initialize seenb ← 0 for all boys b still in play.
19: for all boys b still in play do
20: while seenb = false do
21: FindAndEliminateT radingCycles(b)
22: end while
23: end for
24: end for
25: return M
26: ENDMETHOD
27: METHOD EliminateProposalsByBoy(b, g0)
28: while Indexb ≥ 0 do
29: g ← PBb,Indexb
30: if g = g0 then
31: break
32: end if
33: EXISTSb,g ← false
34: if Topg = b then
35: Topg ← Secondg
36: Decrement Secondg
37: end if
38: while Secondg ≥ 0 and EXISTSPGg,Secondg ,g =
false do
39: Decrement Secondg
40: end while
41: Decrement Indexb
42: Decrement NumProposalsg
43: end while
44: ENDMETHOD
45: METHOD FindAndEliminateT radingCycles(b)
46: seenb ← 1
47: g ← PBb,Indexb
48: b2 ← PGg,Secondg
49: if b2 = −1 or seenb2 == 2 then
50: seenb ← 2
51: return (−2,−2) {Dead end}
52: end if
53: if seenb2 = 1 then
54: seenb ← 0 {Cycle found: mark b unvisited}
55: return (b2, g) {first boy in cycle and his new match}
56: end if
57: (head, g2)← FindAndEliminateT radingCycles(b2)
58: if head = −2 then
59: goto line 50 {Dead end}
60: end if
61: if head = −1 then
62: goto line 46 {Cycle was eliminated, so repeat}
63: end if
64: EliminateProposalsByBoy(b2, g) {Give b2 his new
match, namely the girl currently held by b}
65: seenb ← 0 {b is part of the cycle, so mark him unvisited}
66: if head = b then
67: EliminateProposalsByBoy(b, g2) {Reached the
head of the cycle}
68: return (−1,−1) {Tell the parent to repeat}
69: end if
70: return (head, g2)
Correctness: EliminateProposalsByBoy(b, g) eliminates
all proposals by boy b to all girls less preferred than g,
and updates the state accordingly. It is trivial to note that
all State variables correctly maintain their semantics after a
completed call to this method. Note that Index might hold
duplicate values sometimes (thus not representing a valid
bipartite matching). However this is not of concern since it
is never used with that semantic while this occurs.
FindAndEliminateT radingCycles(b) does a Depth First
walk, starting at b, of a specially constructed directed graph
over the boys, in the hopes of finding a trading cycle. This
directed graph has an edge from each boy b, to the second
best preference of the girl at Indexb, if such exists. This is
actually the second preference of the girl who prefers b best
from all her proposers and whom b prefers least from all his
proposals, except while a trading cycle is materialized in lines
64-70.
Like with all Depth First walks, it could either reach a dead-
end (either directly or by hitting a priory fully explored node -
cross edge) or find a cycle. If it finds a cycle we shall show it
is an impossible to veto trading cycle -, it materializes it and
then continues the search from right before it entered it (from
the parent). Note the fact this special graph has for each node
at most one outgoing edge. When a cycle is materialized, the
graph changes - but only slightly. Only the nodes on it plus
the parent can have their either outgoing edge changed (or
removed). This change can happen as a result of a boy b having
his Indexb changed in lines 64 or 67 and thus potentially
changing the boy who is immediately better preferred than
him at that girl. Note that all such girls were priory occupied
by boys also on the cycle. It follows that no fully explored
node (status 2) can have an edge to any of the boys on the
cycle if it did so after the materialization of the exchange,
it must have pointed to some boy on the cycle prior to this
also, which means the cycle would have been explored earlier
in the Depth First walk. Since each node has at most one
outgoing edge it means no partially explored nodes (status
1) can point to any of the boys on the cycle even after its
materialization, except potentially the parent. As such, after the
cycle is materialized, the Deapth First walk can safely continue
on the altered graph from the parent (which is re-explored
thanks to lines 61-63): all explored or partially explored nodes
and edges are the same.
Note the following invariants pertaining to how the graph
is constructed and maintained. If there is an edge from b1 to
b2, the following are true: (i) b1 is best preferred at his match;
(ii) b2 prefers b1s match over his own and (iii) b2 is second
preferred at b1s match after b1. Note that all these hold before
and after a cycle is materialized in lines 64-70: boys on the
cycle become matched to what is now a girl who prefers them
best thanks to invariant (iii). Invariant (ii) holds due to the
elimination of proposals by a boy which are worse than his
current match, in lines 64 or 67. Initially it holds due to the
nature of Gale-Shapley algorithm: proposals are made by boys
in order of preference stopping at their final partner. Invariant
(iii) holds by the very construction of an edge in line 48.
Thanks to invariant (ii), a cycle found in Line 53 is a trading
cycle. Thanks to invariant (i) it is also impossible to veto
legitimately: any boy outside the materialized cycle will either
have a better partner than a girl g on the cycle, or be less
preferred by g than her current match (both before and after
the trading cycle is materialized).
FindMatching() repeatedly finds a hopeless man, elimi-
nates his proposals and then repeatedly finds and eliminates
trading cycles which are impossible to veto until there are no
more. We now show that the resulting matching, represented
by the state variables is actually the Gale-Shapley matching
for set of outstanding boys after each hopeless man had been
eliminated. Proof is by contradiction.
Assume for the sake of contradiction there exists a proposal
(b1, g1) eliminated by line 19 which is actually part of the
Gale-Shapley play for the outstanding boys. Take without
loss of generality the first such proposal which is wrongly
eliminated. It must have been eliminated either by the materi-
alization of a trading cycle, or as a consequence of it become
irrelevant. But once a trading cycle is materialized all boys are
guaranteed to get at least as good a match. Thus clearly all
proposals to less preferred girls must necessarily be removed
once this happens. This means the erroneous proposal (b1, g1)
must have been one of those eliminated directly as part of the
materializing the trading cycle. If any such proposal was to
be kept, the cycle cannot materialize. But if b1 does not leave
g1, can boy b2 who was supposed to get g1 as part of the
trading cycle still improve over his then current g2 (as part
of a different trading cycle perhaps)? Not really: If b2 was to
improve, that means he would leave g2. However, thanks to
invariant (ii) b1 prefers g2. Thanks to invariant (iii), if b2 leaves
g2 (for whomever), then b1 becomes best preferred there.
As such it cannot be that both proposal (b1, g1) exists and
proposal (b2, g2) does not exist are true, since Gale-Shapley
produces a strictly stable matching. Thus, proposal (b2, g2)
must also remain. This means b2 also does not improve over
his partner before trading-cycle materialization. Inductively,
none of the boys on it improve. Thanks to invariant (i), it
follows that for all boys on that cycle have their partner
before materialization as their final partner. This would mean
the correct solution includes this trading cycle. However, the
Gale-Shapley outcome is man-optimal over all strictly stable
matchings [10]. As such, it cannot contain any trading cycle
which cannot be legitimately vetoed, thus a contradiction,
meaning all proposals (b, g) eliminated by line 19 are not part
of the Gale-Shapley run for the outstanding boys.
Now assume for the sake of contradiction that there is a
proposal (b1, g1) which is not eliminated although it should
have been. Without loss of generality assume (b1, g1) is the
least preferred proposal by b1 of those wrongly not eliminated.
Consider the moment line 19 completes. By the first part of
the argument, all proposals eliminated until then do not belong
to the correct solution. Also, since it completes, it follows that
there are no longer any trading cycles which cannot be vetoed
legitimately. Thanks to invariant (i), we have that b1 must be
the best preferred choice of g1. Furthermore, if g1 is not b1s
Gale-Shapley partner, it must be someone elses, namely b2s.
By the prior argument, all proposals by b2 up until at least
g1 are still in the solution set produced, never having been
wrongly eliminated. This means b1 is not alone to propose
to g1: at least b2 also did, if not others too. Now take b3 to
be the second best preference still in play of g1. It could be
the same as b2 or different. Then let g2 be b3s match in the
solution proposed by the Algorithm. Clearly g2 is different
from g1 since b1 gests g1, not b3. Also clearly, b3 prefers g1
over g2. If b3 is not b2, b3s proposal to g1 cannot exist in
the correct solution, since this would imply g1s temperature
is raised irremediably above b2 who is supposed to be her
Gale-Shapley partner. This means b3 gets better than g1 in the
correct solution and in such a solution he never proposes to
neither g1 nor the worse preferred g2. If b3 is actually b2, still
the proposal by b3(= b2) to g2 cannot exist since it would be
beyond his Gale-Shapley partner. It does follow that g2 is not
b3s Gale-Shapley partner for sure (such a proposal necessarily
exists in the correct solution). This means there are at least
two proposals at g2: one by b3 and one by her Gale-Shapley
partner. Note that there will be an edge in the graph from b1 to
b3. Inductively we thus construct the path originating in b1 and
going along edges in the final graph. Since line 19 completed,
this path cannot lead to a cycle (such a cycle would a trading
cycle which cannot be vetoed). But also inductively no boy in
the path is alone to propose at his current match. It follows
there is an outgoing edge from each boy. Thus such a cycle
must actually exist (not necessarily starting at b1). We have
obtained a contradiction implying that no proposal is wrongly
kept either.
Since no proposal is either wrongly kept or wrongly deleted,
and since no new proposals can appear in the correct solutions,
it follows that the output of line 19 actually performs a correct
update of the matching given the elimination of a hopeless
man. Thus, inductively, we have that the output produced by
Algorithm 2 is the same as that of Algorithm 1.
Complexity Analysis: Consider the total number
of iterations happening in line 39 in method
EliminateProposalsByBoy(). Note that at every iteration,
Secondg is decreased for some girl g. By the loop condition,
Secondg cannot go below −1. Secondg is initially the index
of the second best proposal girl g gets, which is at most
n, having been initialized in line 7 of FindMatching().
It is never thereafter ever increased. As such there cannot
be more iterations than n ∗ n = O(n2) for all the n girls.
One execution takes O(1) so the total amount of time taken
by this line is O(1) ∗ O(n2) = O(n2). Now consider how
many times lines 29-42 execute in total. Note that in line
41 Indexb is decremented for some boy b and by condition
in line 28, it never goes below −1. Indexb is initialized in
line 5 by FindMatching() to be precisely the number of
proposals b makes. It is never thereafter ever incremented. As
such, the total number of lines 29-42 execute is no more than
the total number of initial proposals by all boys, which is
O(n2). An actual execution of these lines takes O(1), except
the time taken by line 39 which is O(n2) in total. As such,
the total time consumed by EliminateProposalsByBoy()
is O(n2) ∗O(1) +O(n2) = O(n2).
Line 19 of FindMatching() actually does a Depth
First walk using FindAndEliminateT radingCycles() on
a graph with at most n nodes and at most n edges.
This walk is somewhat complicated by the fact certain
nodes are considered more than once as cycles are ma-
terialized. What is the total number of times line 46 of
FindAndEliminateT radingCycles() executes in total? It
executes precisely one time for each boy b the last time
when it eventually returns −2 for each execution of line 19 in
FindMatching(), plus one more time for every case when
some seenb was set to 0 by lines 54 or 65 plus another more
time for each case when line 62 calls for a repeat due to
a cycle having been materialized. Note that every time line
54 or 65 happen, at least one proposal is eliminated from
play by the subsequent application of Line 64 or 67 as the
recurrence folds back. As such the total number of times seenb
is set to 0, in lines 54 or 67 for all boys b cannot be greater
than the total number of initial proposals, which is O(n2).
How many times does line 62 call for a repeat? Precisely
every time when a trading cycle materialization completes
in Line 68. Since materializing any trading cycle causes at
least 2 proposals to be removed, there cannot be more than
half as many trading cycle materializations as there are initial
proposals, which is O(n2). As such, the total number of times
line 62 calls for a repeat is O(n2). Thus, the total number
of times the body of FindAndEliminateT radingCycles()
executes is n ∗O(n)+O(n2)+O(n2) = O(n2). The running
time of the body itself is O(1) it contains no loops plus
the time taken within calls to EliminateProposalsByBoy().
The latter time we showed to be O(n2). As such, the total
running time of FindAndEliminateT radingCycles() is
O(n2) ∗O(1) +O(n2) = O(n2).
Line 14 of FindMatching() is clearly O(n) since all girls
could be exhaustively tried (it could be made even faster
but there is no need), as do lines 18 and 19, excluding the
time taken by FindAndEliminateT radingCycles() which
is O(n2) in total. Lines 15-17 all take O(1) except time
consumed by EliminateProposalsByBoy() which is O(n2)
in total. As such, line 13 total takes n∗[O(n)+O(1)]+O(n2)+
O(n2) = O(n2) for all the n iterations. The total number
of times line 9 executes for some girl g cannot exceed the
index of her best proposal, which is at most n. As such, for
all n girls, line 9 takes at most n ∗ n = O(n2) time. Lines
4-11 take O(1) each time they execute, plus O(n2) in total
for line 9. They are executed for each proposal happening
as part of Gale-Shapley algorithm, of which there can be
at most O(n2). Thus, the total running time of line 3 is
O(n2) ∗ O(1) + O(n2) = O(n2). Line 2 takes O(n2) and
line 25 takes O(1). Thus FindMatching()’s total running
time is O(n2) +O(n2) +O(n2) +O(1) = O(n2).
We have thus shown that Algorithm 2 takes O(n2) running
time in total. Given that there are O(n2) preference list items
given as input, this is linear in the size of such input.
In terms of memory complexity, only O(n2) or O(n) space
is used by any of the constant number of State or Helper
structures employed. The memory complexity of running
Gale-Shapley once is also O(n2). As such, the total memory
complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(n2) which again is linear in
the size of the input.
We have implemented FindAndEliminateT radingCycles()
using recursion. This was done mainly for clarity and the
method could easily be rewritten without it. The total number
of simultaneous recursive calls is O(n), since there are at
most n boys in total in the graph. This could become a
problem in practice if n is large enough to cause a stack
overflow.
V. TOP TRADING CYCLES METHOD DOES NOT
ALWAYS PRODUCE THE FARSIGHTEDLY STABLE
MATCHING
In [10], Huang proposed using the top-trading-cycles
method known from housing allocation to improving the out-
come for the boys in a Stable Marriage Game. We know show
that this approach is not ideal, since it sometimes requires the
existence an unfeasible coalition. We show this by means of
counter example. Consider the following instance of the Stable
Marriage game.
Example 1:
B = {b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7}
G = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7}
Preferences of boys, most preferred first (only relevant ones):
Pb1 g1
Pb2 g2, g3, g5, g7
Pb3 g5, g3
Pb4 g3, g2
Pb5 g3, g5, g4
Pb6 g3, g6
Pb7 g2, g6, g5
Preferences of girls, most preferred first (only relevant ones):
Pg1 b1
Pg2 b4, b2, b7
Pg3 b3, b6, b2, b5, b4
Pg4 b5
Pg5 b7, b2, b5, b3
Pg6 b6, b7
Pg7 b2
Running Gale-Shapley algorithm over Example 1 produces
the following matching: b1− g1; b2− g7; b3− g3; b4− g2; b5−
g4; b6 − g6; b7 − g5. Running Algorithm 2 on the other hand
produces the following unique farsightedly stable matching:
b1 − g1; b2 − g7; b3 − g5; b4 − g2; b5 − g4; b6 − g3; b7 − g6.
The top-trading-cycles method proposed to be used by
Huang in [10] involves taking this outcome and seeking to
improve it by materializing trading cycles in some specific
order. In particular it materializes first the trading cycle which
leave players on that cycle with their top choice (still in play
at the time). There are different implementations for the top-
trading-cycles method, with an efficient one given in [11].
All implementations however seek to produce the same result.
How will the top-trading-cycles method fair on Example 2?
Note that there exists a trading cycle in the Gale-Shapley
matching for Example 2, g2|b4 → g3|b3 → g5|b7 → g2,
where all of b4, b3 and b7 get their first choice (best preferred
outcome). As such, any implementation of the method will
consider the partial matching b7 − g2; b3 − g5; b4 − g3 as part
of the final outcome. This is incompatible with the unique
farsightedly stable matching produced by Algorithm 2. We
could have simply rested our case here, but we believe it is
important to illustrate why this difference occurs and why it
makes the top-trading-cycles method a poor choice for this
instance.
Note for the top-trading-cycles method to be able to mate-
rialize even the first trading cycle, it requires the cooperation
of b2, b5 and b6 (who could veto the trading cycle). But why
would b6 ever cooperate with such a proposal? In fact for him
this is a scam. For such an outcome he can always initiate
the play b6 → g3|b4 → g2|b7 → g6 thus improving things
for himself and degrading them for b4 and b7. Note however
that b4 and b7 are not required accomplices of this resulting
matching. Only b2 and b5 (who are both hopeless men) still
need to cooperate for it to materialize. And b2 and b5 are
same-off as in either case. Under Assumption 1 they cannot
have a preference over which of the other boys to be better
off be it b6 or b4 and b7 since they still get the same. While
this assumption may or may not always hold in practice (for
example if b2 is friends with b4) even if they were to veto the
farsighted stable matching that would by no means mean that
the top-trading-cycles one can materialize: it still requires the
cooperation of b6 which can himself then veto it at no cost to
him.
Essentially, what was overlooked in [10] is the relative
power the players have due to the fact that girls are not freely
tradable bilaterally between them (as with the original applica-
tion of the top-trading-cycles method for housing allocation);
any trade requires the consent of some of the others. And as
we have shown by example, some of these others can get a
strictly better outcome for themselves by not cooperating.
This example can also be used to illustrate another phe-
nomenon. If we relax Assumption 2 to allow b7 to make a
play which does not farsightedly improve his outcome (in fact
it degrades it), namely at g5 then he could take revenge on b6
for not accepting the top-trading-cycles outcome where b7 is
better off. This can be argued between players before the game
actually begins and threats of retaliation could potentially
convince some players to make concessions. Threat-making
can give raise to interesting outcomes and situations, which
are outside the scope of this paper and will be analyzed
in a subsequent one. Under Assumption 2, threats cannot
exist since they always necessarily involve some self-harmful
behavior (when compared to the farsighted coalition stable
outcome).
VI. LYING ABOUT PREFERENCES COULD
IMPROVE THE FARSIGHTED STABLE MATCHING
FOR THE LIER
For an instance of the Stable Marriage problem with perfect
knowledge where everyone knows the (true) preferences of
all the others and of the girls then the Farsighted Stable
Matching is the best anyone can hope for, if we disallow self-
harmful threats. However, unlike the Gale-Shapley matching
where lying can only harm a players outcome or leave it
unchanged, using deception when negotiating the collusion
(before the actual game begins) can bear fruit in the case
of the farsighted stable matching. We show this by example.
Consider the following instance of the Stable Marriage game.
Example 2:
B = {b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5}
G = {g0, g1, g2, g3, g4, g5}
Preferences of boys, most preferred first (only relevant ones):
Pb0 g4, g0
Pb1 g4, g5
Pb2 g1,g3, g4
Pb3 g1, g2, g3
Pb4 g2, g1
Pb5 g5, g2, g4, g1
Preferences of girls, most preferred first (only relevant ones):
Pg0 −
Pg1 b4, b5, b3, b2
Pg2 b3, b4, b5
Pg3 −
Pg4 b2, b5, b0, b1
Pg5 b1, b5
Say b2 and only b2 lies about his preference list, swapping g3
and g4.
The farsighted stable matching over the truthful lists is
b0 − g0; b1 − g4; b2 − g3; b3 − g1; b4 − g2; b5 − g5. How-
ever, the farsighted stable matching over the falsified lists is:
b0− g0; b1− g4; b2− g1; b3− g3; b4− g2; b5− g5. Thus b2 can
improve by lying: from his second choice to his best choice.
Lying this way is not permitted by Assumption 2 since it
essentially involves the threat of a forbidden play b2 → g4
which is to a worse choice for b2 than he can get under the
farsighted stable matching (and also worse than under Gale-
Shapley in this case) - under the truthful preference lists of
course. Nevertheless, if the other players believed him, he
might get away with it. Formally this would be just masked
way of making threats of self-harmful actions.
This situation serves to show that players need to be extra
circumspect of the preference lists declared by others when
deciding to engage in coalitions. Sometimes the preference
lists are not declared but are obvious or almost obvious to all
players in the game and thus lying cannot succeed. In other
cases, like in Student Medical Program matching, preference
lists are submitted to some central authority which then does
the matching without them becoming known by others. As
such, players wishing to improve by lying may not know
precisely how to lie given the fact they do not know the
preferences of the others.
Ultimately, lying is just a form of threat-making in the hope
of convincing others to change their strategy.
VII. CONCLUSION
We provided an optimal algorithm for determining the
unique farsighted stable matching. The uniqueness of the
matching ensures an easy collusion strategy: each player
proposes directly to his partner under it.
We argued by way of example that the matching produced
by the top-trading-cycles method, employed in [10] is not
always an adequate choice. This has important implications in
situations where [10] was employed by some central authority
(like potentially in Student Medical Program matching) as
a means to simulate how a Stable Marriage game could be
played out, to the advantage of the proposers. In all such
cases, [10] should be replaced with Algorithm 2 since the
resulting matching could otherwise be unfair to some of the
proposers and also unrealistic in the sense that it could not
occur in practice when all players are rational. We have shown
that players can improve their outcome under the farsighted
stable matching by lying about their preference lists (basically
making disguised threats). We leave open an interesting topic
for further research: What happens when threat making is
allowed? How can threats be used to gain a better outcome for
some boy or group of boys? We will publish some existential
results in a subsequent paper.
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